What Does Stability in a Post-ATMIS Somalia Look Like?
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What Does Stability in a Post-ATMIS Somalia Look Like?
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By Gayatri Sahgal and Gerald Kilimo
May, 2024
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2628, adopted in April 2022, sanctioned the transformation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Following this alteration, ATMIS has continued to advance the goals initially established by AMISOM to carry out peace support operations in an effort to stabilize the country. These efforts reflect Somalia's recent progress in economic development and security improvements. Nonetheless, the progress achieved is at risk due to the planned drawdown of ATMIS, especially as Al-Shabaab’s influence remains strong.
Somalia is doubling down on securing its borders and transforming its economy.
On the security front, since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud assumed power, there has been a renewed offensive against Al-Shabaab. The Head of State recently reaffirmed the government's commitment to weakening Al-Shabaab, while emphasizing on eliminating terrorism as well as rebuilding the national army. Economically, Somalia has recently been experiencing a resurgence. Firstly, after a decade of negotiations and reforms, Somalia has successfully secured a $4.5 billion debt write-off under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, reducing its debt to $600 million and lowering its external debt to less than 6% of GDP from 64% in 2018. This debt relief, along with Somalia's recent entry into the East African Community (EAC)—a market of 300 million individuals—signifies a major milestone in the nation's economic rebuilding and expansion. Moreover, the return of the Somali diaspora has sparked a 6.9% annual growth rate in Mogadishu.
However, Al Shabaab’s influence remains strong, threatening Somalia’s stability post-ATMIS
While President Hassan's renewed offensive against Al-Shabaab is commendable, the task is challenging, particularly as the group still controls significant areas of the country and its insurgency has proven to be resilient. Firstly, counterterrorism experts cite that Al Shabaab’s annual revenue is in the range of $70–$100 million per year. It is estimated that the group allocates about one-quarter of this revenue to weapons and explosives. In contrast, Somalia's 2023 defense budget was $143 million, the highest ever and was largely funded by foreign contributions. This implies that Al-Shabaab's military capabilities are more or less on par with that of Somalia. Despite military pressure and global efforts to starve it of financing, Al-Shabaab continues to operate effectively due to its robust financial base, allowing it to function as a quasi-government in the areas of Somalia it controls. Moreover, the country’s security challenges are compounded by political tensions, with constitutional amendments fueling discord among clans and federal member states, such as Puntland's declaration of independence. These internal rifts risk fragmenting the nation's united front against Al-Shabaab, potentially offering the group opportunities to exploit the divisions and entrench its influence further.
On the economic front, Somalia's recovery is likely to take long to stabilize, especially as Al-Shabaab continues to collect illegal taxes from businesses. For example, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) collected and analyzed over 800 tax receipts issued by al-Shabaab tax officials to commercial drivers passing through their checkpoints between July 2015 and October 2021, with each receipt amounting to at least US$151.This long-standing issue remains unaddressed, and acts as a barrier to private sector activity. The group has been honing a highly centralized system of extortion at ports of entry and roadways for nearly two decades, mostly within the territory it holds. Its operatives maintain a registry of citizens’ assets for the purpose of collecting an annual 2.5% “zakat” tax. The “zakat” collection system is enforced through systematic intimidation and violence. Although investments from the Somali diaspora have seen a slight increase, Somalia's full investment potential remains untapped. This is reflected in the real GDP growth, which dropped to 1.7% in 2022 from 2.9% in 2021, highlighting the inherent fragility of Somalia’s economy.
Last but not least, Al-Shabaab has consistently provided services such as security and law enforcement in regions that remain beyond the reach of the central government, allowing it to sustain itself within a competitive ecosystem of contested governance. This strategy aims to disrupt the relationship between government security forces and affected communities in the region. While the military has received support from local militias to counter Al-Shabaab, the latter’s service delivery wins the hearts and minds of a significant populace and consequently gaining local backing for the militia. In the long haul, this dynamic undermines the legitimacy and authority of the central government, making it more challenging to establish effective governance in those regions. This local support not only strengthens Al-Shabaab's operational capabilities but also complicates counterterrorism efforts, as the group can embed itself more deeply within communities,
Clearly, Al-Shabaab’s influence remains strong. Given that ATMIS, which has been central to Somalia’s progress, is set to leave the country after already withdrawing 5,000 troops and with another 4,000 troops set to exit by June 2024, Somalia’s gains will likely be destabilized to an extent. Given the complicated dynamics between the government, Al-Shabaab, and local communities, the Federal Government of Somalia may need to reconsider its approach towards Al-Shaab and pivot away from elimination to negotiation.
Gayatri Sahgal is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania and Gerald Kilimo is an Analyst at Botho Emerging Markets Group