Should Saudi Arabia join BRICS+?
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Should Saudi Arabia join BRICS+?
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By Saniya Syeda, Research Analyst, Botho Emerging Markets Group
October 28, 2022
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has shifted the international order, forcing countries to realign their global geopolitical alliances. In the midst of an evolving global political economy, the regional bloc BRICS (consisting today of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is looking to expand into BRICS+, inviting membership from multiple countries from the Global South, including Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, which has historically played a pivotal role in the Middle East, has been seeking to diversify its multilateral cooperation to position itself as a leader in the Global South and beyond. With BRICS+ membership beckoning, the questions then emerge—should Saudi Arabia join the evolving BRICS+ grouping? And what value does the bloc bring to the country?
The lackluster performance of BRICS and its constituent economies
Any assessment of the BRICS+ coalition's potential is incomplete unless it considers the performance of its predecessor bodies, first BRIC and then BRICS. The bloc, which began as an economic model to forecast global economic trends over the next half-century, saw mixed results from its member economies, which have faced a spectrum of issues, from tumultuous oil prices and Western sanctions, to the 2008 global financial crisis and corruption.
Moreover, the economic performance of the BRICS countries only speaks to the strength of the individual economies, rather than the bloc as a whole. And this is where the greatest fragility of BRICS as an economic bloc lies. For the most part, BRICS has lacked a clear common policy and political action framework for member countries to follow and align on. Analysts in India, for example, blame the delay in establishing the then-BRICS development bank, now known as the New Development Bank, on a lack of shared political will. The member countries were promised that this development bank would reimagine multilateralism and development finance. However, even though the bank conceptualized a system that allowed it to avoid the Western-dominated development finance coalitions by lending and trading in local currencies, its performance has been mixed so far. For example, despite having approved over US$12 billion in loans since its commencement in 2014, the bank had disbursed less than 8.5% of the approved loans by 2019. Meanwhile, although currency trading agreements are meant to constitute a major area of cooperation for BRICS countries, many of these agreements - such as the one between Russia and India - pre-date BRICS, raising questions on the impact of the bloc.
Therefore, in the economic context, the value of BRICS and its development bank to Saudi Arabia and other new entrants remains debatable.
To what extent does BRICS offer value to Saudi Arabia?
Although BRICS began as an economic model, with finance and economy at its core, it is the "politics and security" cooperation aspect of BRICS that has been at the centre of its expansion ambition. This, combined with Saudi Arabia's evolving relationship with its Western partners, makes the geopolitical value of BRICS a key consideration for the Saudis as they assess the BRICS+ opportunity.
Tracing back BRICS’ history of political and security cooperation, its performance has been rather underwhelming. Despite political cooperation being a core tenet of cooperation for BRICS, the existing five countries have often been unable to achieve consensus on common goals in the international arena. The most recent example of this was when Brazil voted against Russia in the UN Security Council. BRICS' inability to take coordinated political stances was highlighted once again when the bloc failed to mediate or arrive at a consensus in the border-related political conflict in which the Chinese army took control over Indian-administered areas, effectively staking a claim to Indian territory. The incident has dual undertones. Firstly, it is indicative of the outsized political influence China wields in the regional community. Evidencing this further, the recent BRICS+ expansions have largely been led by China and backed by Russia, with the other three members taking a back seat, even though no country holds veto power in the bloc. Secondly, it also indicates the members’ prioritization of self-interest over collective interest when it comes to the member countries’ own security concerns, indicating the relative lack of security value the bloc offers.
That said, there are potential benefits for incoming member countries like Saudi Arabia in joining BRICS+, most notably deepening ties with the strongest non-Western global superpower, China. In recent years, China has been a key investor in global development projects, and having China on its side is likely to boost Saudi Arabia’s investment attraction bid in line with Vision 2030. Moreover, with the presence of Russia and the potential addition of other major energy exporters like Kazakhstan, the group will become a key platform for Saudi Arabia to cooperate on global energy, aside from the existing ones. It will also help Saudi Arabia deepen and diversify its engagement with its non-Western international allies.
However, to gain any tangible value from this cooperation, Saudi Arabia will either need the BRICS countries to showcase stronger political will and economic cooperation to reach fruitful multilateralism or engage with the countries bilaterally, using BRICS only as a convening to facilitate these bilateral engagements. Keeping these constraints in mind, Saudi Arabia might be better off increasing bilateral cooperation or exploring trilateral partnerships alongside China to engage with other emerging countries in the Global South and further its foreign policy goals, especially those of an economic nature. Trilateral funding engagements with China, for example, in Africa, a region that Saudis are increasingly interested in and where China has an established and widespread presence, are likely to benefit Saudi Arabia more than engaging in diluted multilateralism. Trilateral cooperation will allow Saudis to gain a stronger say and visibility in their engagements rather than driving them through an organization like BRICS+ where the grouping takes the narrative centre stage. Keeping these considerations in mind, it would be safe to say Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy gamut might be better off without BRICS+ than with it, unless, of course, it wants to ruffle feathers in the West!
Saniya Syeda is a Research Analyst at Botho Emerging Markets Group
Photo by Hala AlGhanim on Unsplash